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inhabitation principally from a virtue consideration (aretaic positions; Alasdair MacIntyre) of architecture
(the designed built environment and design processes) and architects (designers of the built environment).
Architecture’s ethical attributes are briefly examined from four perspectives: 1) purposefulness (which is less
about utility than it is about intent, motive, power relations, and civic purpose); 2) material production
(which is more to do with labor sources and material origination to durability and sustainable design practices
than construction per se); 3) aesthetics (beauty, image, meaning and human flourishing); and 4) practices
(the dimension of relationships and conduct in the socio-political-economic context of landscape
fabrication). The virtues of the architect from perspectives of the mastery and maintenance of architectural
knowledge, creativity and ingenuity, the exercise of skill and judgment, and personal values and professional
conduct. Three cases from practice: the design of prisons, the design and construction of a Social Services
Clinic, and the selection of recyclable construction materials, test the preceding while considering the good
and the just regarding environmental design and designing, which are explicit and embedded in the theme
statement supporting “Design and Justice.”
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This paper addresses the ethical good and the just in the environments we design 
and shape for our inhabitation principally from a virtue consideration (aretaic posi-
tions; Alasdair MacIntyre) of architecture (the designed built environment and de-
sign processes) and architects (designers of the built environment). Architecture’s 
ethical attributes are briefly examined from four perspectives: 1) purposefulness 
(which is less about utility than it is about intent, motive, power relations, and civic 
purpose); 2) material production (which is more to do with labor sources and mate-
rial origination to durability and sustainable design practices than construction per 
se); 3) aesthetics (beauty, image, meaning and human flourishing); and 4) practices 
(the dimension of relationships and conduct in the socio-political-economic context 
of landscape fabrication). The virtues of the architect from perspectives of the mas-
tery and maintenance of architectural knowledge, creativity and ingenuity, the ex-
ercise of skill and judgment, and personal values and professional conduct. 
Three cases from practice: the design of prisons, the design and construction 
of a Social Services Clinic, and the selection of recyclable construction materials, test 
the preceding while considering the good and the just regarding environmental de-
sign and designing, which are explicit and embedded in the theme statement sup-
porting “Design and Justice.” 
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This paper explores threads that bind the 
complex realms of ethics, justice and architecture. 
Considerations of intent and duty are added to the 
central justice concerns of fairness, rights, equality 
and liberty as they may pertain to architecture. Nei-
ther the account of justice nor that of architecture is 
complete or perfected. However, sufficient defini-
tion of their intersection may help to illuminate fac-





This article continues my exploration of ar-
chitectural ethics (Wasserman, Sullivan, & Palermo, 
2000; Palermo, 2001) – extending it to the consider-
ation of the CJR theme challenge regarding justice as 
it pertains to design practices, the designer (archi-
tect), the designed and built environment (architec-
ture and landscape), and their affects. It is written 
from the perspective of an educator and practicing 
architect – which is to say, from outside the general 
discourse on social and political justice. Its origins 
are in the field of applied ethics. 
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PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE 
The field of justice studies being quite broad, with 
roots in ethics, political theory and law, a few com-
ments on the justice perspective explored in this pa-
per are in order. Justice considerations focus on the 
impacts that choices and actions stemming from 
ethical, social and political circumstances have on 
the community of participating and affected persons 
with respect to: equality, rights, fairness, and liberty. 
Fairness and equity may pertain to access to society’s 
goods, and/or redistribution of privately held goods, 
or those held in common, to those who are in need 
or are least advantaged (Rawls, 1971); liberty to min-
imal interference in one’s affairs, and the right to 
pursue personal interests, and, from a libertarian 
perspective, the unfettered retention of the fruits 
thereof (Nozick, 1974). Sometimes attempts are 
made to calculate the total good of the outcomes for 
the affected persons -- as in contemporary cost-ben-
efit calculations, which have  
their roots in Utilitarianism (Bentham, 1789/1988; 
Mill, 1861/1987), for public design and construction 
projects such as city plans, highways and transpor-
tation systems and individual buildings.  
A concise introduction to the multiplicity of 
justice perspectives can be found in the opening 
chapter of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? where 
Alasdair MacIntyre (1988) points out that there ex-
ists  
“a set of conflicting conceptions of justice, con-
ceptions which are strikingly at odds with one 
another. ... Some .. make the concept of desert 
central, while others deny it any relevance at all. 
Some .. appeal to inalienable human rights, oth-
ers to some notion of social contract, others 
again to a standard of utility. ..  [These theories 
also disagree] about the relationship of justice to 
other human goods, about the kind of equality 
which justice requires, about the range of trans-
actions and persons to which considerations of 
justice are relevant, and whether or not a 
knowledge of justice is possible without a 
knowledge of God’s law.” (p. 1) 
and notes that:  
“.. what many of us are educated into is, not a 
coherent way of thinking and judging, but one 
constructed out of an amalgam of social and cul-
tural fragments inherited both from different 
traditions from which our culture was originally 
derived (Puritan, Catholic, Jewish) and from dif-
ferent stages in and aspects of modernity (the 
French Enlightenment, the Scottish Enlighten-
ment,  nineteenth-century economic liberalism, 
twentieth-century political liberalism).” (p. 2) 
MacIntyre moves on from here to articulate a history 
of Western justice concepts and the formulations of 
rationality upon which they rest. 
Another synopsis of competing stratagems 
for social justice is articulated by S. Mulhall and A. 
Swift (1996, p. xvii): 
“.. the communitarian critique [of liberalism] 
has concerned itself rather with these freedom-
related aspects of liberalism than with its equal-
ity-related or distributive aspects. In terms of 
substantive political issues, what this means is 
that where the debate between redistributive 
liberals [Rawls, et al] and libertarians [Nozick, et 
al] centres on the justifiability of the welfare 
state and the taxation required to pay for it, that 
between the liberal and the communitarian 
[Sandel, MacIntyre, et al] concerns itself rather 
with the importance of the individual’s right to 
choose her own way of life and to express herself 
freely, even where this conflicts with the values 
and commitments of the community of which 
she is a member.” 
While each of the perspectives respects the 
autonomy of the individual with regard to integrity 
and safety of self, for the libertarian that autonomy 
and the right to liberty with minimal interference is 
primary; for the redistributive liberal account is 
taken of those who need assistance with the requi-
site that others provide the needed assistance; and 
for the communitarian social action occurs within a 
community of shared values and expectations -- nec-
essarily tempering total autonomy.   
Will Kymlicka (1990, p. 161) presents yet another 
synopsis of competing justice perspectives in this 
note regarding the Marxist critique of liberalism: 
“Where liberal egalitarian theories of justice try to 
employ private property while negating its inequali-
ties, Marxists appeal to a more radical theory of jus-
tice that views private property as inherently un-
just.” Among other scholars who define and explore 
competing theories of justice in a foundational man-
ner are Archard (1996), Barry (1989), and Lebacqz 
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(1986). Also, there are good readers that introduce 
classic and contemporary materials on justice (e.g., 
LaFollette, 1997; Goodin and Pettit, 1997). 
These debates at the theoretical limits of normative 
political theory are beyond the scope of this explora-
tion. Here I shall limit myself to the more generally 
understood expectations of just social-political cir-
cumstances: those in which individuals have auton-
omy and integrity; in which each individual pos-
sesses certain rights to liberty and equality of treat-
ment; and in which gross inequalities, transgres-
sions, and access to and possession of life’s goods are 
balanced with some measure of fairness.     
 
ARCHITECTURE IS CONSTRUCTED  
ETHICS -- DEMANDING JUST  
PERFORMANCE 
If there is one theme that I trust will pervade 
throughout it is this thought: Architecture is Con-
structed Ethics. Karsten Harries (1997, p. 4) proposes 
that the ethical function of architecture is the con-
struction of ethos, making it a futures oriented en-
terprise. I concur, but I would add that the making 
of architecture is also an ethical enterprise that de-
mands choice and decisions about “the right thing 
to do” with respect to designing and building our in-
habited landscape. The landscape we inhabit, then, 
is also a constructed ethics. Moreover, it may be 
judged in terms of how well it meets the challenges 
of justice.  
 
COULD BE AND OUGHT TO BE 
When we first make conjectures about a 
change in the environment, we cast about for what 
could be, the potential for a good change. Specific 
design proposals define what ought to be, an ethical 
imperative of the right thing to do. This section con-
tains premises regarding the shift from could to 
ought explored more fully in “Meditations on Qual-
ity” (Palermo, 2001). 
Architecture (shaping the landscape we in-
habit) is fundamentally a projection about a future 
state of affairs: what could be. The origination of ar-
chitectural projects lay in some person, a committee, 
a board of directors, or a community of persons 
dreaming and conjecturing about the future: if I(we) 
were to build a new place (a church, an office build-
ing, a genetics research laboratory, a school, etc.) 
then life would be better (worship would be more 
meaningful and inspired; the work and laboratory 
environment more commodious and supportive of 
productivity; learning would be enriched, etc.). We 
do not undertake architectural ventures to lower the 
quality of life. Making architecture, thereby posi-
tively influencing the quality of life, is about creating 
that beneficial situation toward which humanity 
strives: what ethicists refer to as the good. For any 
particular good outcome to in fact be good, one may 
evaluate it in terms of its justness with respect not 
only to those directly involved, but also to all those 
affected in some manner. 
The ethical center of architecture is this: ar-
chitecture does not belong to the architect. Archi-
tecture is about distilling the essence of what could 
be in the client's terms (however broadly client may 
be defined: for example, an individual including 
one’s self; a corporation; residents in a community; 
the inhabitants and users of a place), and transform-
ing it into architectural proposals. It is the essential 
act of discerning architecture's origins, purpose and 
impacts in a given circumstance. Such listening and 
understanding is more than a programming and de-
sign skill, is more than good business practice, it is 
an ethical mandate. Without it, architecture is an 
abstract formal exercise in search of a reason for be-
ing.  
When conjecture about the environment 
moves to action to bring about a desired end, a shift 
happens. Intentions are defined more formally in 
terms of spaces and needs; desires and value expec-
tations are more clearly articulated; budgets are de-
veloped; and site locations and contexts are defined, 
etc.: the architectural project is defined. The archi-
tect's contribution is this: explorations, analyses, in-
ventions, and creation of specific design proposals 
that address the issues at hand. Form and image are 
made specific; how a place ought to be is definitively 
proposed. Functional objectives are resolved; struc-
tural, environmental conditioning and construction 
assemblies are designed; appearance beauty and im-
age are determined; and all of this is subject to eco-
nomic resource allocation. Out of an infinitude of 
possibilities, a singular, or at most a limited number 
of proposals are shaped. The architect's invention re-
defines what could be, as what ought to be, an ethi-
cally constructed ethos. 
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In a design proposal, there are a particular 
set of relationships between landscape and building 
form, exterior form and interior space, the room and 
the object, image and meaning: these are physically, 
visually, and experientially particular. They are how 
it ought to be; the it being the place and the manner 
of inhabitation inseparably constructed. The archi-
tect has made an ethical determination of the best 
way to change the environment to support the better 
way of life that was the originating position of the 
project. 
Architectural practice is a futures oriented 
process: designing and making decisions regarding 
the particular way that future state of affairs ought 
to be. No design decision, e.g., relation to context, 
form and space, functional resolution, aesthetic 
quality, material fabrication, is neutral. The archi-
tect needs to understand the experiential implica-
tions of design proposals. They are all culturally con-
nected; they are all consequential for the present day 
life and into the future. In Winston Churchill's 
terms: "We shape our buildings, and afterwards, 
they shape us!”(Churchill, 1943).The shift from what 
could be to what ought to be is an ethical shift; it is 
a shift that requires just performance. 
 
ARCHITECTURE'S ESSENTIALLY  
ETHICAL CONDITION  
As noted in the preceding section, architec-
ture in its broadest sense can be conceptualized as 
the practices of thinking about, designing and con-
structing humankind's places of present and future 
inhabitation. Those places include buildings, urban 
and rural landscapes, and interiors. They utilize nat-
ural and economic resources, shelter us from the el-
ements, frame spaces for various uses, and symbol-
ize our institutions. The practice of architecture in-
cludes immersion into all facets of the discipline 
from history and theory, tectonics, and design, to 
the social-political-professional-craft process of 
bringing built-form about. This section builds upon 
the five “Ethical Lenses” proposed in Ethics and the 
Practice of Architecture (Wasserman, et al, 2000, 80-
91), through which to examine the essentially ethical 
nature of architecture. Setting aside “Aesthetics,” 
and “Ideological Position,” three are explored here. 
Discussion of them is extended to address certain 
concerns of justice that emerge in the case studies 
that follow: 
1. Purposefulness. Architecture is grounded 
in human intention and purpose. It is therefore sub-
ject, as are other human affairs, to judgment with re-
spect to its intentions and outcomes: who and what 
purposes are served by those intentions, how well 
those intentions are met. These are not only practi-
cal or utilitarian judgments, but also ethical. For ex-
ample, intentions and purposes may be beneficial or 
good (a day care center) or harmful or evil (a geno-
cide machine). A project may serve an economically 
disadvantaged community (a community-based 
sweat-equity housing project), or it may contribute 
to suburban sprawl (a urban fringe strip-mall). They 
may serve the interests of despots, dictators, military 
juntas, or democracies; they may serve the interests 
of powerful individuals against or for the public in-
terest; and they may displace or marginalize the 
weak, or the discriminated against (ghettos still ex-
ist). Ethical judgment needs to be reached in evalu-
ating architectural project intentions and purposes.  
 
Beyond origination intents and purposes, judgment 
of how well those are met through proposed archi-
tectural solutions is another measure of relative 
merit or goodness of the built result -- 'goodness', in 
this sense, being the ethical virtue of the work: how 
well it satisfies its intended purposes. Issues of pur-
pose are central to Case #1 and the first part of Case 
#2. 
2. Material Production. Architecture is a 
material production (1). The built inhabited land-
scape tends to be large and demands many resources 
for its accomplishment. Once having been built, 
even ephemeral portable architecture such as tee-
pee’s or yurts have a physical and enduring presence, 
even if only for a short period of time at any one 
place. Material production uses natural resources ei-
ther held or needed in common. Those resources 
may be used well or wastefully (more than one soci-
ety has made itself extinct due to desertification of 
its locale). With the growth in global population and 
standard of living expectations, sustainable practices 
of resource use and settlement patterns is almost an 
ethical imperative. Material production is the cen-
tral element of the arguments in Case #3.  
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3. Praxis. Praxis is used here to highlight the 
total array of practices that making architecture re-
quires, and to break the implied 'business' or 'profes-
sional' limitations often associated with practice. 
Praxis focuses us on thoughtful action arising from 
the knowledge of a discipline. In addition to its be-
ing the built landscape, architecture is a practice, or 
a collection of practices, an art. The virtue of practice 
is here used in the sense that the contemporary phi-
losopher Alasdair MacIntyre has recaptured from 
Aristotle: that of the virtuous practice of a discipline 
which defines its content, quality and ends, and 
which therefore can be judged regarding its ethical 
merit (MacIntyre, 1984). This applies to both the ac-
tivities of practicing and the resultant works of prac-
tice. All three cases demand the exercise of profes-
sional knowledge and judgment through the prac-
tices of the discipline. 
Through these three lenses (and the two that were 
not discussed), the embedded ethics within many 
seemingly everyday events in architectural practices 
may be assessed. It is important to assert the case for 
the engaged ethical practice of architecture because 
there are not a few who view the vicissitudes of prac-
ticing with a cynical eye. In a widely hearalded col-
lection of “the most important essays on architec-
tural theory at the close of the 20th century” (Hays, 
1998), Robin Evans (1998/1982) offers these thoughts 
in a positive review of an exhibition of drawings by 
Daniel Libeskind: 
“The architect can travel light. His work does 
not now involve him in the tedious entropy of 
getting something built, nor in the dubious pol-
itics of improving social conditions, nor in the 
appalling sycophancy of client sucking, nor in 
reconstructing his personality to fit his job. ... 
Libeskind....by cutting out the aspects of archi-
tecture that are brimful of meaning -- its all too 
vivid meaning as a social, economic and political 
process of construction -- ... allows for the con-
struction of lines in the sky.” 
Libeskind’s Chamber Works are mesmerizing draw-
ings of great beauty. What is rueful is Evans’ derisive 
language of indictment regarding the essences of ar-
chitecture in the making that are contended here to 
be its essential condition to be architecture, and 
from whence it gains its ethical and justice import.   
 
SUMMARY PROPOSITION  
The making of architecture is an ethical event; the 
architecture made, constructed ethics! Because of 
architecture’s inherent publicness, its reliance on 
common resources, and its impacts on all persons -- 
its social-political-legal-economic origination and 




Three cases from practice: the choice to design pris-
ons, the design and construction of a Social Services 
Clinic, and the specification of recyclable construc-
tion materials, test the preceding while considering 
the good and the just regarding environmental de-
sign and designing, which are both explicit and em-
bedded in the CJR theme statement. 
 
A PRISON FACILITY CASE: TO DESIGN OR 
NOT TO DESIGN 
Award-winning and well-published archi-
tecture and engineering firm ABC has about 65 
people on staff. The firm has specialty design capa-
bilities in corporate headquarters, research centers, 
K-12 schools, university facilities, historic preser-
vation, and justice facilities including detention and 
prison facilities of all sorts. 
A Senior Associate and principal designer 
informed the Principals of the firm that he did not 
wish to, and would not, work on detention and 
prison facilities projects if asked. He said: “I be-
came an architect to work on projects that represent 
the best of human aspirations, not the worst. I find 
prisons themselves and the approach taken to them 
as commodity space with our large governmental 
clients to be lacking in that positive aspiration. 
They are negative warehouses for people.” 
The firm assured him, that even though 
they disagreed with his reasoning and position, and 
while justice facilities were a major part of the 
firm’s consulting work, that he would not be asked 
to work on those types of projects. The firm has 
enough talented senior staff to rearrange assign-
ments. 
 
This case, originating in a liberal, democratic, 
open market society, contains multiple ethical dimen-
sions. Among them: 1) the ethical intents that inhere in 
particular project types, i.e., in the architecture itself; 2) 
the “right” of an employee in a free-market society to 
decline to perform certain types of work for their em-
ployer; 3) the impact on the firm that would result from 
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all members of the firm exercising a “right of choice” 
with respect to work tasks; 4) the impact on other firm 
members as a result of the special consideration given to 
this one employee, e.g., who does design prison facilities 
then?; and 5) the concept of paternalism in corporate 
leadership that enables choice.  
While this case begins with the consideration of 
justice facilities and prisons as its focus, the questions of 
justice that arise are related less to the technical design, 
and business and professional ethics of such projects and 
their fitness to purpose, than to their aspirations and so-
cial-political role. Is it the case, as asserted by the Senior 
Associate, that justice facilities, as opposed to religious 
centers or universities, arise in the negative side of hu-
man intention? Whether they are part of a criminal jus-
tice system arising from deterrence (punishment severe 
enough to deter crime), deserts/punishment (progres-
sively severe punishment befitting crimes), a rehabilita-
tive (rehabilitating the criminal so that he or she can re-
turn to productive society), or restorative (taking into ac-
count restitution to those harmed) position, prisons are 
physical architectural manifestations of the social-politi-
cal consideration of isolating the relatively few who are 
guilty of criminal transgression against society, from the 
many who are law-abiding. Certain prison designs, such 
as Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, analyzed by Michel 
Foucault (Foucault, 1979), and H.H. Richardson’s Alle-
gheny County Jail in Pittsburgh, the set for many films, 
are historically important architectural designs. Other 
prisons such as the Tower in London, or the Bastille in 
Paris, however infamous, are also famous -- they capture 
the imagination about a time, place. 
Is it a matter of business, personal or profes-
sional ethics for an architect, who, unlike ordinary busi-
ness people in a free-market society, is licensed by the 
state to protect the public health, safety, and welfare to 
withhold design services from a socially sanctioned pro-
ject? What if all architects decided to not design prisons, 
thereby causing others with fewer skills to design and 
build them (for they would be built)--quite possibly re-
sulting in less secure and less humane designs? What if 
the socially sanctioned purpose were a more generally 
acknowledged “unjust” project such as a gas chamber? 
Does type matter? Are these decisions sliding along 
some scale? Are the decisions to be based upon rights, 
e.g., of the many for the right to peace of mind, with the 
architect therefore incurring a duty to society to design a 
secure prison so that the populace may find that peace? 
Upon teleological outcomes, e.g., for the few to receive 
just due, with the architect therefore incurring a duty to 
design a humane, but, nonetheless, a penal facility? Of 
contractarian order as the result of a social compact to 
allow/require prisons, with the architect as a citizen of 
the compact therefore incurring a duty to design prisons 
to serve society’s objectives?  
As with most case studies, the intent is not to 
resolve and prove a positive path through the case, but to 
raise essential questions that may shed some light on the 
issues embedded in the case, in turn, instigating reflec-
tion and debate regarding the case. The focus here has 
been on perhaps two issues: 1) Does the architect, who 
is specially licensed by the contemporary state to bear 
the title and practice based upon specialized expertise, 
owe a duty to the granting society to exercise and provide 
that expertise for its projects? Is the relationship between 
certain professions and society commutative? (Consider 
the public defender system; emergency medical care.); 
2) If a social project is just in its origin, are the principles 
of a professional’s liberty to choose to participate and 
society’s rights to humane environments foundational or 
circumstantial and consequential? For surely as a practi-
cal matter, at least some architects would choose to de-
sign prisons, even if one or a few do not? Yet, liberty for 
one to defer is liberty for all to defer. 
The architect’s request and the firm’s decision 
seem to be a benignly resolved private marketplace situ-
ation. But, the request begs larger questions of the rela-
tionship between licensed professionals and their duties 
to the society that grants them monopoly control of their 
expertise; and it entails a judgment regarding the aspira-
tions and justness of societal enterprises that requires 
validation.  
 
SOCIAL SERVICES CLINIC CASE Pt. 1: 
PROCESS, APPROVALS AND CONSTRUC-
TION: 
A Social Service Center (SSC) located in 
a 30,000 person city that is part of a 250,000 popu-
lation metropolitan area undertook to design and 
build a new clinic. At the clinic, the SSC intended 
to offer its full array of family planning counseling 
and information services, as well as pre-natal medi-
cal services and, in appropriate cases, elective 
abortions. 
Within a 150 mile radius of the city, an 
area with a population of nearly a million people 
that included parts of three states, there were liter-
ally dozens of architectural firms with the qualifi-
cations to design the clinic. None responded to the 
advertisement for design services. After calling 
several firms noted for their medical clinic design 
practices, SSC representatives discovered: 1) some 
firms did not respond because the leadership of the 
firm did not approve of abortions; 2) other firms 
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did not respond because while the firm had no res-
ervations about abortions, many of their clients did, 
and they could not risk the loss of business.  
Eventually a well-qualified woman-owned 
design firm in a large city 250 miles distant in a 
fourth state accepted the commission and carried 
out the design work. 
Bidding and constructing the project met 
with similar resistance, for a mix of similar rea-
sons. No general contractors in the immediate vi-
cinity nor in the expanded 150 mile radius would 
bid the project. Eventually, a construction contract 
was negotiated with a general contractor in a city 
170 miles distant. Twenty-eight regional masonry 
contractors declined to bid on the project. The 
29th, the sole bidder, got the subcontract for ma-
sonry. 
The need for these types of business con-
cerns, beyond sensationalized national cases, was 
reinforced locally by anonymous hate mail, phone 
threats, and mailed packages with “baby’s coffins” 
that the contractor, the architect and the SSC direc-
tor all received. In the case of the architect, the lo-
cal bomb squad was called in to open the plain 
brown box. No culprits were ever identified. 
During the design phase, planning and 
zoning approval, building permitting, and medical 
facility certification (state governmental permit), 
the SSC was consistently denied approvals, or re-
quested to meet extraordinary requirements by 
elected or appointed public officials. During the 
five years it took to complete the project, the SSC 
pursued the denials in five different lawsuits, all of 
which it won: the denials were not substantive as a 
matter of law according to the courts. The denials 
had taken the appointed and elected representatives 
“off the hook” with respect to local community 
mores. 
 
To outside interested parties, one person’s so-
cial services clinic is another person’s abortion factory. 
Unlike most of the other medical clinics in the metropol-
itan area, this SSC clinic would perform abortions upon 
request. There can be no doubt that one of the primary 
(and inflammatory) ethical/justice debates of the last 
quarter-century in America has been over a woman’s 
right to make choices with respect to herself and her 
body, and the proposition that all life is sacred and de-
manding of protection, including the life of a fetus that 
cannot live outside its mother’s womb. Architecture is a 
part of both systems of thought. Family planning, medi-
cal advising, and pre-natal healthcare all occur some-
place: that someplace is a building: architecture. Legal 
abortions likewise take place in buildings: architecture. 
It is not the place of this paper to debate the merits of 
either position, except as the conflict over the architec-
tural project became a matter of justice. 
Throughout the US, family planning services, 
medical care including pre-natal care, and abortions per-
formed upon demand are legal. The right for women to 
make the choice to have an abortion is protected under 
the Constitution according to Roe v. Wade. The services 
of the SSC are indisputably legal. Moreover, because the 
SSC is underwritten by private resources, it is virtually 
the only source of access to such services for a signifi-
cant number of economically disadvantaged women. 
The majority of women served by this particular SSC 
had limited economic means. Several key concepts in 
justice are a part of this scenario: 1) definition of a soci-
etal good  (medical services and abortions); 2) access to 
society’s goods; 3) assistance with access for the least 
advantaged (the women without economic resources); 4) 
the right to security in the integrity of person (choice for 
the mother; protection for the fetus), and 5) the conflict 
between what is legal and what some may view and 
moral or immoral with respect to what is legal. 
What comes into play in this case is a) moral 
principle: the principles of those who disagree with the 
SSC’s legal social and medical mission and who choose 
to not participate in the project based upon their personal 
beliefs; b) raw power: that of intimidation of and retalia-
tion against those who agree with the SSC’s mission, and 
that of political influence with appointed and elected of-
ficials; and c) contravention of the social contract that 
has found the mission of the SSC to be acceptable, and 
the contravention of the rights of access of disadvantaged 
persons to social services. The resultant impacts delayed 
the project, and provoked “legal” and “redtape” road-
blocks by agencies in authority that were eventually all 
dismissed by the courts. 
Beyond these design and construction process 
events, there were a number of specific design accom-
modations made to protect the users of the clinic and to 
provide an experientially positive environment: 
 
SOCIAL SERVICES CLINIC CASE Pt. 2: DE-
SIGN AND MATERIAL CHOICES: 
The SSC clinic originally had a budget of 
$750,000 based upon the renovation of an existing 
building in the downtown area of the city, making-
use of nearby public parking and public transit. Af-
ter meeting public and political resistance the SSC 
purchased a suburban site in a Planned Unit Devel-
opment that already had several other medical and 
hospital clinics in it. This site was only accessible 
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by automobile, and required designs and expendi-
ture for on-site parking and perimeter security.  
Final design plans had the following fea-
tures built in: 1) the public street side had a ma-
sonry wall to above eye-height – interior spaces on 
that side of the building were lit by clerestory win-
dows; 2) glass on the entry side of the building was 
reflective so that outsiders could not see in; 3) a 
$100,000 security system was installed; 4) a spe-
cial 4-hour fire protected records vault was con-
structed; 5) the site had a separate doctor’s drive-
way and secured entrance; 6) within the perimeter 
of the building envelope, two exterior atrium type 
courtyards were constructed so that staff and pa-
tients could “step outside” without public interfer-
ence; 7) the palette of exterior building materials 
was restricted to those that could be “graffiti-
proofed”; 8) all exterior design items such as signs 
were designed to be vandal-proof. 
The project at the new location cost over 
$2,000,000. 
 
As a result of the conflict between the protected 
rights of the SSC, and community condemnation based 
upon a differently based universal principle of the sanc-
tity of all life, the project was not only delayed, but 
ended up being relocated to a less advantageous loca-
tion for the SSC’s clients, subjected to many unantici-
pated design demands, and cost nearly three times the 
original budget. 
Since the SSC existed in the city before the con-
struction of the clinic, and has existed comfortably in the 
community since its construction, it is the social-politi-
cal-economic process of the architectural project that be-
came the lightening-rod for community grievance over 
SSC and its mission. The community was enjoined in a 
debate over the nature of local community values, na-
tional constitutional rights, and the issue of life itself re-
garding the outcomes of the project. It was the architec-
tural event that raised multiple issues of justice: 
• Is it justifiable for a licensed professional to with-
hold professional services because they person-
ally disagree with the intentions that a project will 
serve? Are there limits in either direction? 
• Is it justifiable in a democratic free market for 
some to threaten to withhold votes or to withhold 
economic contracts from those who would work 
with a third party with whom the group disagrees? 
Would your perspective change with respect to 
acts of conscience if it were your enterprise and 
you personally that were being intimidated? 
• Is it justifiable to design a humane environment 
such as one with gardens and special security 
qualities to support what many would hold are in-
humane activities, even if they are legal?  
• In what manner do rights accrue, and how invio-
late are rights? 
• When systems of justice based upon different 
concepts come into conflict, i.e., rights of adults 
versus a priori values about unborn fetuses, how 
is the dispute to be resolved? 
• When protagonists such as the SSC and the larger 
community do battle, who is protecting the inter-
ests of the most affected group: the women and 
families seeking SSC’s services? Is it justifiable 
to deny them access to needed services and care?  
All architectural projects require that choices be made. 
Those choices are not value free. Both the ethical and the 
just are encompassed in architectural works. We are in-
ured to them because the art and design of architecture, 




TION MATERIALS CASE: 
Aluminum is a mainstay of contemporary 
construction systems. It is used for surface panels, 
glazing systems, curtain wall and storefront sys-
tems, etc. It is light, workable, does not rust, holds 
sharp definition formally.  
It is also extremely resource intensive to 
extract and refine in production. Mining often takes 
place in “invisible” parts of the world: 59% of the 
mined bauxite ore originates in western Australia, 
central Brazil, and Guinea, and none of the world’s 
top ten producers are in North America. Then of 
course, it is milled into final usable forms. In the 
manner that aluminum cans can be recycled, cer-
tain aluminum building products, which are a bit 
more first-cost intensive, are also recyclable. 
 
In our contemporary global economy, how is the 
use of single-use disposable, as opposed to recyclable, 
construction materials justified? Are there ethical/justice 
implications inherent in basic construction materials? 
Everyday, all over the world, architects sit down 
to select and specify building materials, building sys-
tems, and their attendant labor systems for projects as di-
verse as back-porch additions and Olympic stadiums. Is 
it too onerous a thought to burden these parochial and 
local choices conceived and perceived as pertaining to 
appearance, durability, cost and constructability with the 
weight of justice? In what way do these architectural 
choices pertain to justice? 
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There are those who pursue the issue of the eth-
ical standing of the environment, per se. Here we may 
assert that even considering ecosystem earth as a produc-
tive source to support human endeavors with no ethical 
standing, there is at least one matter of ethical conse-
quentialist concern: if we deplete earth, what is next for 
humankind? A StarTrek-like existence in starships in 
search of a new world? A hope (wish?) that technologi-
cal advances will keep us ahead of depletion? Consider 
that it is the general public, not architects, who pushed 
for, and passed, environmental legislation in the US and 
Europe. 
One of the technological systems that we have 
mastered is the extraction, production, use, and recycling 
of various earth resources, including those that go into 
buildings. As a matter of logic, it would seem that given 
the numbers of people on earth, the inequities of access 
to goods and life quality that need to be addressed, the 
rates of use of resources, that we ought to at least recycle 
materials when possible. Can doing otherwise be justi-
fied? 
Matters of international economic justice, envi-
ronmental justice, and global inequalities with respect to 
access to life’s goods are major areas of discourse. Many 
products being used in the richest third of the world (the 
largest refiner of bauxite into aluminum is the US), orig-
inate in less developed nations. They are part of those 
nations’ national product. Without turning this into a 
geo-political debate regarding the WTO, clearly, build-
ing products and enterprises are part of such globally 
connected markets. Indeed, though, banking systems and 
financing in the developed world favor “least first cost” 
and secure investment systems: a rate of return on invest-
ment is needed. The difficulty is that the rate of return 
and the investment in architectural projects, both private 
and public, are often drawn too narrowly: at the limit of 
the immediate open-market transaction at hand.  
If contracting entities have reached what each 
considers to be legal, fair exchanges (the libertarian cri-
terion for valid acquisition) -- has justice been served? 
Even if one or both parties operates in a political land-
scape without environmental protection laws, or labor 
rights laws (conditions which may affect the liberal point 
of view)? Depletions of global resources, inequities in 
global labor rates, befouling the environment (in places 
conveniently out of sight from North America), rather 
than being ameliorated are often being exacerbated. Wit-
ness the Texaco TV advertisement (shown regularly dur-
ing the winter of 2000) that shows geologists hugging 
and tasting rocks at the most pristine of wilderness sites 
searching for oil and then pans away from the wilderness 
to speak optimistically about finding the energy to meet 
society’s needs. One can alternatively tune in to  CBS 60 
Minutes to see an exposé on the degradation caused by 
Texaco’s pipelines and production facilities in the Andes 
and Amazon. 
This may seem to play fast and loose with generally 
acknowledged “hidden” environmental costs. Nonethe-
less, landscape construction (civil and architectural) is 
among the US’s largest industries. From within architec-
ture, sustainable environmental design practices such as: 
reusing and recycling buildings and  
 
building materials, designing buildings for more effi-
cient use of energy, making them more energy neutral, 
proposing urban development patterns that are less infra-
structure intensive, etc., are strategies that we currently 
have available while not decreasing living standards and 
choice. They affect non-renewable resources, renewable 
resources, environmental impacts, labor expenditure and 
international exchanges. With the possibility of specify-
ing recyclable materials as a matter of architectural 
choice, is it just not too? Who would you define as the 
affected parties with respect to the ethics and justice of 
the social-political-legal-economic process of architec-
tural realization? 
SUMMARY: EMBEDDED ETHICS AND JUST RE-
SULTS 
Rippling throughout the practices of architec-
ture are processes and decisions that involve ethical 
choices with respect to the landscape we shape and in-
habit. Those choices are concerned with social intent and 
purpose, private and public rights of access, use of global 
resources, fabrication and construction labor, economic 
exchange, etc. Each design professional, in each design 
choice, is proposing a better world – one that intrinsically 
improves the human condition. The built result not only 
entails ethical origination, but has implications for jus-
tice as well – for architecture is a large-scale public en-
terprise affected by, and affecting, many individuals as 
well as whole communities. In the global situation of 
contemporary architecture, those communities are often 
regional and international as well as local. Specific pro-
fessional, legal and contractual concerns are less the is-
sue than the larger systemic social-political-ethical ones 
that originate in what is a necessarily collective action. 
Each built work can be understood and evaluated as a 
manifestation of equity, access, and distribution, sup-
portive of particular rights and fairness. 
Given that architecture originates in thought, 
the range of thought incorporated must move beyond 
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commonly understood functional and aesthetic consider-






1. Stating that architecture is material production does 
not deny the critical power of architectural thought and specu-
lation. It is only that such speculation in drawing, text, model-
ing, film and other media and virtual reality simulation is ar-
chitectural -- of architecture -- and a stimulation to imagina-
tion, but it is not architecture. 
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